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Dynamic Trade Creation
Eric O'N. Fisher and Neil Vousden

1. INTRODUCTION

The emergence of large trading blocs as a central feature of the world
economy has led to renewed interest in customs unions and free trade
areas. Analysis of preferential trading arrangements has traditionally
focused on static trade creation and diversion. However, as world cap
ital markets have become increasingly integrated, it is clear that the
dynamic effects of trade policy are also of great significance.
The analysis of preferential trading areas necessarily involves
changes from a tariff-ridden equilibrium, so we are already in a world of
the second best. Hence, it would not help further to muddy the analyti
cal waters by assuming that the source of growth is some economy-wide
externality. Thus we are drawn to the class of growth models studied
by Jones and Manuelli (1990) and Rebelo (1991). Also, because we
are interested in the effects of commercial policies across time, it is
natural to assume that agents do not live forever. Thus, we maintain
analytical simplicity by imposing the discipline of a strictly neoclassical
framework with no increasing returns and no bequest motives.
The burden of this discipline is that endogenous economic growth
can occur only if the economy has at least two sectors. 1 The most
natural economy has a consumption sector, an investment sector, a
1

Thus, we hark back to an older tradition of two-sector models in international economics,
originating with Uzawa (1964) and Srinivasan's (1964) extensions of Ramsey's (1928) classic.
Galor (1992) has put some new wine into that old bottle.
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reproducible factor, and a fixed factor. Boldrin (1992) and Jones and
Manuelli (1992) show implicitly that one-sector growth models ignore
a crucial element in the development process: that investment goods
become cheaper over time so that the fixed factor can afford an in
creasingly large stock of the reproducible factor from a finite stream of
revenues. Fisher (1992)'showed that the supply side of Rebelo's (1991)
model captures the asymptotic behavior of a wide class of neoclassi
cal economies where agents have finite lives and long-run growth can
occur.
Why are two sectors necessary? The assumption of finite lives (with
out a bequest motive or an explicit role for government policy) imposes
a very stark financing constraint on a growing economy. In particular,
each generation must purchase an increasingly large stock of repro
ducible resources (capital, broadly defined) from a finite stream of
revenues (lifetime labor income). Even though real wages become un
boundedly large in a growing economy, the rate ofgrowth of real wages
does not keep up with the rate of growth of the capital stock. Thus, the
financing constraint will bind eventually, and sustained growth will be
impossible.
A one-sector growth model with a Cobb-Douglas production func
tion provides some sharp intuition. In this case, endogenous growth
can occur only if capital's share is unity, but then labor's share is zero.
Hence, there is no source of savings from wage income, and the econ
omy with overlapping generations cannot grow.
How can one overcome this financing constraint? There are three
possibilities. First, one can assume that there is an economy-wide
growth externality; indeed, this is the path that much of the modern
literature has followed. For us, this tack has an unfortunate and in
eluctable side effect: it introduces a further complication into a second
best world where preferential trading arrangements are already dis
torting. Second, one can assume that there is a role for government;
permanently redistributive policies, typically in the guise of capital tax
ation, will overcome the financing constraint. This assumption may be
tenable for the closed economy, but it is hard to see a simple ana
log for the open economy. Taxing domestic capital to enhance world
growth typically would not be politically feasible. Third, one can as
sume that there are two sectors in the economy. This assumption intro
duces one relative price - the current price of investment (in terms of
consumption forgone). Then growth can occur because the real price
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of investment may become increasingly cheap as the world economy
develops.
Again, the Cobb-Douglas case gives sharp intuition. Consider now
an economy with Cobb-Douglas production functions in two sectors.
Assume that the share of labor income in the consumption sector is
strictly greater than zero, and its share in the investment sector is ex
actly zero. The latter assumption allows the economy to grow, and the
former assures that there will be some wage income in every genera
tion. On a balanced growth path, the value shares of the two sectors
in gross domestic product (GDP) remain constant. However, at con
stant base-year prices, the consumption sector grows more slowly than
the investment-goods sector, the engine of growth for the economy.
The key insight is that the GDP shares of consumption and investment
remain constant only because the relative price of investment good
decreases as the economy grows. Hence, the real wage can grow suf
ficiently rapidly to purchase a rapidly growing stock of capital from a
finite stream of wage income.
Several economists have already sought to adumbrate a theoretical
basis for the dynamic effects of liberalized trade. Baldwin (1992) de
fines and calibrates dynamic gains from trade in Europe due to induced
capital accumulation along the transition between steady states in a
variant of a Solow growth model. Using endogenous growth models,
several authors have identified links between economic integration and
growth. Some are based on externalities associated with learning by
doing (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Young, 1991), and others focus on economies
where novel ideas or products generate growth (e.g., Grossman and
Helpman, 1991; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). Applying a hybrid of
these models, Kehoe (1994) shows that Spain grew rapidly following
her entry into the European Community.2 Since the role of prefer
ential trading regimes motivates much of this recent work, it seems
appropriate to analyze these arrangements explicitly.
Our model may seem old fashioned to a modern reader. In particu
lar, world growth occurs only because of capital accumulation. There
are no economy-wide externalities, there is no emphasis on Schumpete
rian innovation, and there are no simple Pareto-~proving government
2

Spain entered the Community in 1986. Kehoe documents a change in its trend of investment
from an annual 1 % decline in the five years preceding entry into an average increase of
10% per annum for the five following years. Similarly, the growth rate offoreign investment
in Spain increased fivefold between those periods.
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policies. These facts may cause some readers to dismiss this analysis
out of hand, but we beg for a moment's indulgence. Because the analy
sis of preferential trading areas is already complicated enough, we are
really proposing the simplest economy in which endogenous growth is
possible and agents have finite lives.
The skeptical reader might further ask, why bother with overlapping
generations? Isn't the standard model in macroeconomics the one with
infinitely lived agents? Some might argue, quite to the contrary, that
many interesting issues in general equilibrium theory arise precisely in
models in which agents' lives are finite. In a model of economic growth,
this has two very important implications. First, commercial policies
influence both people alive now and those not yet born. In international
economics, the former are Stolper-Samuelson effects, and the latter are
growth-enhancing effects. Second, world growth trajectories typically
cannot be Pareto ranked. In particular, increasing the rate of world
growth is usually not Pareto improving.
In international economics, this observation gives rise to an im
portant subtlety in the analysis of any commercial policy. There are
four classes of agents that matter: (1) the current generation at home,
(2) their counter-parts abroad, (3) future generations at home, and
(4) their counter-parts abroad. Consider, for example, a domestic tar
iff that protects a capital-intensive industry in a two-by-two economy.
The Stolper-Samuelson effects imply a rise in the real income of do
mestic capitalists and a fall in that of domestic workers. If the tariff
reduces domestic imports of capital-intensive goods, it will also lower
the real income of foreign capitalists and raise the real income of la
borers abroad. The effect that such a tariff has on the world growth
trajectory is also obviously important, and it will surely influence an
infinite stream of unborn generations at home and abroad. We show
that the growth effect depends on whether the country - more gen
erally, the trading bloc - in question is a host or source of foreign
investment Because the financing constraint plays such an important
role in these economies, the link between commercial policy and for
eign investment should not come as a complete surprise. But, to the
best of our knowledge, no one has analyzed this link so explicitly
before.
Our central contribution is to identify dynamic trade creation. Static
trade creation is an increase in the volume of trade when the world
growth rate remains unchanged; we show later that this corresponds
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to increased volume of trade in final goods that is the counter-part of
interest income from abroad. Dynamic trade creation is an increase in
the volume of trade in final goods when the world growth rate changes.
Net trade creation is the sum of these two effects. Our main result is
that any change in commercial policy that creates net trade enhances
world growth.
In a static economy, the growth rate is given exogenously, each coun
try's current account is balanced, and static trade creation occurs when
a policy raises the volume of trade. In a dynamic economy, the world
growth rate is determined endogenously, a country's current account
typically is not balanced, and dynamic trade creation occurs when a
change in distorting tariffs changes growth and affects the volume of
trade. Commercial policy always has two effects in a growing world
economy: it alters the volume of trade at the (fixed) original growth
rate and it affects the volume of trade as world growth changes. An
important contribution of this chapter is to show that the sum of these
two effects is positive if and only if a change in tariffs increases a coun
try's external surplus, induces a fall in world interest rates, and causes a
rise in world growth. Thus, when moving from one second-best equilib
rium to another, there is net trade creation if and only if world growth
increases. We show that the static and dynamic effects always work in
opposite directions, but their relative magnitudes can be determined
unequivocally.
Commercial policy creates dynamic trade through its influence on
the incomes and savings patterns of a trading bloc. Although our model
captures the long-run behavior of a wide class of economies, its supply
side has a special structure, and the final-goods sector is labor inten
sive. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem then implies that a tariff on
this sector raises the real wage, the source of savings. In countries that
are sources of foreign investment, this policy enhances growth. But in
those that host foreign investment, such a tariff reduces growth and
benefits fixed factors at the expense of the current owners of capital
and future generations in all countries.
Although these results are quite general, applying to all the trade
structures we consider, the case of free trade areas is worth particular
mention. Richardson (1995) notes that a common feature of this form
of preferential trade is the proliferation of rules of origin designed to
prevent arbitrage across member countries with different external tar
iffs. Even though these rules protect domestic producers by specifying

120

Eric O'N Fisher and Neil Vousden

minimum local content requirements, a free trade area that removes
tariffs on internal trade in investment unambiguously reduces global
protection of investment goods. This result suggests that rules of ori
gin may be less restrictive than they appear because administrators
face difficulties in disentangling current domestic content from that
produced using past viritages of capital.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The second section
describes the model, and the third section defines a balanced growth
path for the distorted world economy. The fourth section derives the
direction of trade, and it examines the growth effects of both most
favored-nation tariffs and the formation of customs unions. The fifth
section analyses protection-reducing and protection-enhancing free
trade areas. The sixth section suggests directions for future research
and argues that all our results are much more robust than the assump
tions of specific utility functions and production functions might lead
the reader to believe.

2. THE MODEL

We use the model of overlapping generations developed by Fisher
(1992, 1995); its supply side is in the spirit of the models of Jones and
Manuelli (1990) and Rebelo (1991). In each country in any period,
there are two generations, the young and the old. In the initial period,
the old generation lives only for one period and finances consumption
from the ownership of the economy's inherited stock of capital. Every
other agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young and nothing
else. This agent lives for two periods and saves some of his wage in order
to purchase capital and finance consumption when old.
There are n countries and two goods. In keeping with the Heckscher
Ohlin paradigm, we assume that technologies are identical across coun
tries. Country j has a fixed number of agents per generation, IJ,3 and
The first sector produces the con
its capital stock at time t is
sumption good, and the second produces the investment good. As in
the literature (Ethier and Horn, 1984; Richardson, 1995), each sector
can be thought of as a composite of many goods, some imported and
others exported. The consumption aggregate comprises all the final

K!.

3

It is simple to generalize our results to the case where all countries' populations are increas

ing at the same exogenous rate.
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goods that create utility for agents in the world economy; output of the
consumption good in country j at time t is
Qj = (Kj
t,1

t,1

j )1-fJ
)fJ (Lt,1
'

(1)

where K/'1 is the input of capital and L{1 is that of labor. The invest
ment aggregate consists of intermediate goods that increase the world's
capital stock. Its output is

Q{2 =

r K/'2'

(2)

where the input is analogous.
All goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive, so each fac
tor is fully employed. The full employment conditions in country j
are

Lu S Lj

and

k{1

+ k(2 S kj.

(3)

Capital in the jth country follows the transition equation

k!+1 = Q{2

+ Z!,

(4)

where Z! are imports of investment goods into country j at time t.
We are implicitly assuming that capital depreciates completely. This
assumption underscores the notion that a period corresponds to the
working life of the typical agent. Although we treat this reproducible
factor as physical capital, it could just as well be any accumulable input
whose private and social rates of return are equal.
Trade in investment goods is different from trade in financial claims.
The pattern of ownership of firms in each period is determined by the
disparate saving decisions of all the agents in the world economy. In
the model of overlapping generations, (perpetually) imbalanced trade
is the norm, not the exception. 4 In international economics, it is best to
think of these as models of pure absorption. A country with a high sav
ings rate has a relatively low propensity to spend from current income,
and it will tend thus to run surpluses on current account. In a growing
world economy, this means that it will acquire net foreign assets in each
4

This is an old (if poorly understood) point. David Gale (1971) showed that perpetual trade
imbalances arise because countries earn interest on net foreign assets, but the current
account was balanced in each period in his model. Fisher (1990) emphasized that trade
imbalances can arise solely because of government policies. Of course, in a model of en
dogenous growth, because new assets are being created in every period, countries can run
perpetual trade deficits and permanent current account surpluses!
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generation. We now turn our attention to the determinants of savings
in the world economy.
An agent in country j born at time 0 has preferences given by
(5a)
and the analogous agent born at time t 2: 1 has the utility function
,
.I
.I
U},I(C}' c}, )

I , 1+1

" I '
'I
= (l-a})logc)'
+a}logc}'
I
1+1'

(5b)

cr

where s is the consumption at time t of an agent born at time s in
country j. Since a i is the marginal propensity to save from permanent
income, the preferences described by Equation (5b) entail that the
savings rate is independent of the real interest rate. This assumption is
not without loss of generality, but it makes for a simple description of
the balanced growth path in terms of the savings rates and commercial
policies of each country.
Let Pt,i be the border price in period t of good i. Also, let r/ be
country j's constant gross ad valorem tariff rate on good i E {l, 2};
thus, the domestic price of good i is r/ Pt,i. 5 The numeraire is the con
sumption good in the first period and Pl,1 == 1. Hence, all prices are
present prices, PI == Pt,l! Pt,2 is the relative world price of the consump
tion good in period t, and 1 + il+l == Pt,l! Pt+l,1 is the world real inter.est
rate from periods t to t + 1.
Firms in sector i E {l, 2} choose their inputs of capital and labor to
maximize profits in each period. Let
and
be the present value
of the wage and rentals rates, respectively, in country j at time t. Also,
let k{1 be the capital-labor ratio in the first sector in that country at
that time. Then equilibrium in the factor markets implies

wi

r1i Pt,l8 (ki1,1 )e-1

R/

vi

::: L't

with equality if either output is strictly positive. Also,
.
. e
'
rf Pt,l(l- 8)(k{,l) ::: W/,

(6)

(7)

again with equality if output of the consumption good is strictly posi
tive. If both consumption and investment outputs are strictly positive,
5

We make the assumption of constant tariffs because we are interested in their long-run
growth effects. Varying tariff rates across time would have transitional effects on the relative
price of the consumption good in each country and on the real interest rate in the world
economy.
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then inequalities (6) imply

k/ 1 = (Br i ptl r)1/1-e,

(8)

r rf;r£

where i ==
is the relative rate of protection in sector 1 in country
j and is unity under free trade. Equation (8) is the standard relation
ship between domestic relative prices and resource allocation between
sectors.
We can now describe the consumer's choices. The old in country j in
period 1 choose
to maximize Equation (Sa) subject to the present
value budget constraint

cf'°

r i ci,o <
1 1

-

Rh.i

(9a)

1"1'

where k{ is the stock of capital per worker owned by the original
residents of country j. Equation (9a) says that an old person in period
1 buys consumption at the local price and has income from rents on
the capital. Each young agent is endowed with one unit of labor. He
chooses (crt, C{~1) to maximize Equation (Sb) subject to
D
Cti,t
r 1i ( rt,1

+ P,t+1,1 Cti,t+1 )

<
_ UTi
Ht·

(9b)

In each period, the young purchase investment goods to finance con
sumption in the final period of their lives. No term having to do with
capital enters Equation (9b) because investment entails no profits in
equilibrium. 6
The utility function (Sa) and budget constraint (9a) imply that

c{'O = R{kf;r!,

(lOa)

and Equations (Sb) and (9b) imply that the consumption profile of a
person born in period t ::: 1 is
+1
( cti,t , cti,t)

= ((1 -

(J

i)uTi;
Ht r 1ip,t,J.,

(J

iUTi;
D
)
Ht r 1i rt,1
.

(lOb)

This completes the specification of the model. The next sec
tion defines an equilibrium for the distorted economy and uses the
6

We have created a model that captures in chiaroscuro Pasinetti's (1962) distinction between
the savings propensities of workers and capitalists. Of course, our model is in contrast
with his, because the marginal propensity of capitalists to save is zero and all savings is
accomplished by workers, the owners of the fixed factors of production. Still, Pasinetti,
among many others, neglected to recognize that many capitalists start out as workers and
acquire assets during the course of their lives. Our model is apposite precisely because the
decision to acquire capital is indeed a central part of the development process.
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market-clearing conditions to derive expressions for the real interest
rate and growth rate along a balanced growth path.
3. BALANCED GROWTH PATHS

Let m = (~1, ... , ~) and Rt = (Ri, ... , R!) be the list of country
specific wage and rentals rates at time t and),) == Lj / 'L =l Lj be coun
try j's constant share of the world population. Then consumption and
investment per worker in the world economy are

f

Ct =

n

I») (c{t-1 + C{,t) ,
j=l

and
n

qt

= I)) Q{2/ Lj .
j=l

A thorny issue in any general equilibrium model with distorting taxes
is how to redistribute the tariff revenues in a neutral manner. This issue
becomes very complicated in a model with overlapping generations,
where society's marginal propensity to save is influenced by how the
government disburses tariff revenues. We follow Rebelo (1991, p. 505)
and impose that tariff revenues are used to finance the provision of
public goods that have no effect on individuals' savings decisions or the
production possibilities of the private sector in any country.? In effect,
this assumption isolates the effects of fiscal policy from the distorting
effects of tariffs. We justify this assumption in three ways. First, tariff
revenues are a very small share of national income in most modern
industrial economies. s Second, there is no practical transparent link
between tariff revenues and fiscal policies designed to affect national
savings rates. Third, since there is only one consumption aggregate
in this model, the redistribution of tariff revenues will not distort the
pattern of consumption, but fiscal policy, in the guise of redistribution
of these revenues, certainly will influence an economy's savings and
7

8

Until now, these distorting taxes could have been easily interpreted as import or export
subsidies. In the rest of the chapter, we are explicitly assuming that any government must
actually raise revenues from its distortionary policies. Since we are analyzing equilibria in
which the local demand and the local supply for intermediate investment good are equal,
it is best now to think of these revenues as arising from a broad aggregate of tariffs on final
consumption goods.
In 1995, revenues from custom duties and fees were about $19 billion in the United States,
where GDP was near $7200 billion. Indeed, the interest payments on the national debt were
greater than $232 billion, more than ten times national tariff revenues.
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growth rates. Thus Rebelo's assumption is particularly appealing in a
model of overlapping generations.
Let the vector of consumption and investment tariffs be T =
(TI, Ti, ... , Tf, T2)· Given these distortions, an equilibrium for the
world economy is a sequence of prices {(Pt,1, Pt,2, lYt, Rt)}~1 and cor
responding aggregate quantities {(Ct, qt)}~1 such that (i) Equations
(1), (2), and (3) describe each country's production and resource con
straints; (ii) Equations (lOa) and (lOb) give each agent's consump
tion decisions; (iii) Equations (6) and (7) relate factor prices and in
tensities; and (iv) Equation (4) describes the law of motion for each
country's capital stock, taking as given the initial ownership of capital
('4, ,. . , kl)·
A balanced growth path is an equilibrium for the world economy
in which all countries' gross domestic products grow at the same rate.
Then kt = Lf=1 ).) k/ gives capital per worker in the world economy at
time t. On a balanced growth path, the gross growth rate of capital per
worker is a constant independent of time. Because each country's share
of world wealth is a constant, countries with relatively high savings
rates acquire a disproportionate share of the new assets created in
each period. They run perpetual current account surpluses.
Since the tariffs are constant through time, intertemporal arbitrage
implies that
Pt.2 =

r Pt+1,2,

(11)

where r is the marginal efficiency of investment. Thus, the decline in
the present price of the investment good is determined by the marginal
rate of transformation between capital in periods t and t + 1.
The relationship between savings and investment is
II

"", j

LA
j=1

(J"

ju,j Ht

-

n
"", j

j

LA T2jp,t,2 kt+1'

(12)

j=1

This equation shows that each agent born in generation t spends a frac
tion (J" j of the present value of his permanent income on the purchase
of capital. Using Equations (6), (7), (8), and (11), we can show that
Equation (12) implies the following relationship between the gross
growth rate of the stock of capital G and the interest rate:

G == kt+l/ kt

= (ptl Pt_l)l/i-fl = [r /(1 + it )F/1-fl.

(13)
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Because the marginal efficiency of investment is fixed at r, an increase
in growth can occur only if real interest rates fall and firms absorb the
increased outflow of capital.
Using Equations (7), (8), (lOb), and (13), we can write country j's
imports of the consuml?tion good m{ as
(14)

where<t>j == 1- (1- u j )(l- e) > O. Now let the world excess demand
for imports be Mt(T, G) == 'L J=l ))m{, where the dependence on the
tariffs and the world growth rate is explicit. The market-clearing con
dition for the consumption good in period t is
n

Mt(T, G)

=

(Pte/r)l~e L»)(Tj)l~e (u j (l- e)r/G - <t>j)

= O.

j=l

(15)
It is important to note that Equation (15) is independent of Pt, the
international relative price the consumption good. Markets clear for
any Pt; thus, tariffs do not have the usual static term-of-trade effects,
but Equation (13) shows instead that the rate of change of the terms of
trade captures the model's essential growth effect. Solving Equation
(15) for the growth rate yields 9

(1- e)r
G=

n

'L ))(Tj)IJjl-lJuj

__-,,--------'--j=_l
n

'L ),) (T j)IJ j1-IJ <t>j

_

(16)

j=l

The gross growth rate of the world's physical stock of capital is an in
creasing function of the marginal efficiency of investment, and it is a
smooth function of any country's relative tariff. Thus, the equilibrium
illustrates a dynamic version of Lerner's symmetry theorem: if there
are no income effects, a tariff on the consumption good is equivalent
to an export tax on the investment good. Showing the existences of a
9

Equation (16) assumes implicitly that all countries have strictly positive outputs of both
goods in each period. A sufficiently large consumption tariff can induce a country to spe
cialize in the consumption good, but full employment implies that there can never be com
plete specialization in the investment good. One can show thllt the condition for complete
specialization is independent of time and, hence, that there is a balanced growth path where
some countries produce only consumption goods. If such specialization occurs in country j,
then 1 = 1<:/ and Equation (16) is changed accordingly to reflect the lower rate of growth
of the world economy. Also, marginal increases in country j's consumption tariff will have
no effect on the world growth rate.

k:
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balanced growth path for an arbitrary array of distorting tariffs, Equa
tion (16) is an important contribution of this chapter. To the best of our
knowledge, no other paper has been able to determine explicitly the
world growth rate for an arbitrary specification of a second-best equi
librium. Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing here that the equilibrium
is a balanced growth path; because all production in both sectors and
preferences is so simple, there are no transition dynamics in this model.
Finally, Equation (13) implies that 1 + it +1 = r / G1- O; thus, on a bal
anced growth path the real interest rate is a constant that is strictly
greater than GO, the growth rate of world consumption. Hence, the
distributive inefficiency that arises from tariffs as distorting taxes is the
usual static one, even though a tariff in any country has a fundamental
effect on the growth rate of the entire world economy.

4. DYNAMIC TRADE CREATION AND THE GROWTH
EFFECTS OF CUSTOMS UNIONS

It is useful to examine the link between a country's trade pattern and its

savings behavior. Substituting Equation (16) into Equation (14) yields
n

j _
-

mt

.l:>..i(r i )0/1-0(a j ¢i _ ai¢j)
i=l
(k j )0
n

L: )J(r i )0/1-0 a i

1,1

.

(17)

i=1

Consider an equilibrium with free trade. Then r i = 1, and ¢i = e +
a j (l- e) for all j. Let 6 = L:7=1 ),Ja i be the average savings rate in
the undistorted world economy. Then Equation (17) reduces to m{ =
e(k/ 1 )0(a i - 6)/6, and a country with an above-average savings rate
imp~rts the consumption aggregate under free trade. The term e(k{l)O
is the share of world consumption output that accrues to capital, and
(a j - 6)/6 is net foreign assets per capita. Thus the analog of Equation
(17) corresponds exactly to country j's interest income from abroad,
and it ties down the pattern of trade in the world economy. Recall that
a high-savings country runs a perpetual current account surplus in a
growing world economy.lO Since imports of the Qonsumption aggregate
just offset interest income from abroad, a high-savings country imports
10

Since each generation saves a constant fraction of its wage income, country j's current
. e .
account surplus at time 1 is (Go - 1)(1- e)e(k!-l,l) (a l - ii)/ii in an undistorted world
economy.
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the consumption good. These imports are simply the interest payments
on net foreign assets that accrue to its older generation. Likewise, in an
equilibrium distorted by tariffs, a country with a high value of a j 11>j
serves analogously as a source of outward investment and growth.
Whether a country is a source or host for foreign investment is crucial
in understanding the effects of tariffs on the world economy.
We can now formally define static and dynamic trade creation. Since
country j's imports depend on its tariffs and the world growth rate,
differentiation of Equation (14) shows
(18)
The first partial derivative on the right side of Equation (18) holds
the growth rate constant and defines static trade creation. In a model
of exogenous growth, this is the only kind of trade creation, because
commercial policy ipso facto has no effect on the growth rate. The
second term on the right side of Equation (18) defines dynamic trade
creation. This partial derivative holds country j's tariffs constant, and
the total derivative captures the overall increase in the world growth
owing to a change in that distortion.
Logarithmic differentiation of Equation (14) shows that (am j Imj)1
(ar j Ir j ) = e1(1 - e) > O. Thus, static trade creation is a positive con
stant; it captures the Stolper-Samuelson effect in this modeL Consider
a 1 % increase in r j . The magnification effect implies that real wages
rise by e1(1 - e)%. At fixed real interest rates, Equation (lOb) shows
that country j's marginal propensity to consume from permanent in
come is unity; thus, aggregate consumption also rises bye 1(1 - e)%.
Also, Equation (8) shows that capital per worker in that sector rises by
1/(1 - e)%. Finally, Equation (1) shows that output per worker rises
bye 1(1 - e)%. Thus, static trade creation occurs ifa source country for
foreign investment raises its tariff on consumer goods or if a host coun
try for foreign investment raises its tariff on investment goods. Because
this expression does not depend on any of the distortions in the world
economy, it serves to underscore that even the static effects of tariff
changes in a growth model are fundamentally different from the usual
static effects that have been explored before. Static trade creation oc
curs because interest payments from net foreign assets increase. Even
if the growth rate is unchanged, the share of net foreign assets owned

Dynamic Trade Creation

129

by a high-savings country will increase. At constant world interest (and,
thus, growth) rate, this country will import more of the consumption
good.
What about the dynamic effects of tariffs? Differentiation of Equa
tion (16) and some algebra using Equations (8), (14), and (17) show
that

j)

)) m!t (r i)e/l-e
(a m tij m t
dGjG =
drijr i
)J(ri)e/1-e<t>i ar i jr i
(k!.l)e
i=l

t

(19)

.

Thus, world growth increases ifand only if a source country for foreign
investment raises its tariff on consumption goods or a host country for
foreign investment raises its tariff on investment goods. The intuition
is that the Stolper-Samuelson effects in a static model have growth
effects when world savings depend on the distribution of income in the
world economy. Moreover, a bit more algebra implies

G)

ami jm i )( dGj
( aGjG
dr! jr!

= _ )) a i (r i )e/1-e

t

),J(r i )e/1-e a i

(ami/m{).
ar! jr!
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Hence, dynamic trade creation has the opposite sign from static trade
creation, but its magnitude is smaller. Also, dynamic trade creation de
pends on all the distortions in the world economy, and it is particularly
strong for a large country.
What is the economic intuition? Consider a source country for for
eign investment that raises its tariff on consumption goods. The static
effect creates trade, since the change in distortions raises the real in
come of and, thus, interest payments to the fixed factors (namely, the
savers) in a country importing consumption goods. Also, the change
in commercial policy raises world growth, so in the long run agents
everywhere in the world will be better off. But some of that increase in
growth is at the expense of a lower volume of trade in final goods, be
cause the surplus country has a lower than average rate of absorption
and acquires more net foreign assets on the new growth path.
What have we shown? If a change in tariffs creates net trade, it raises
world growth. Notice that there are two ways to create net trade. We
have already explored the first: a surplus country can raise its tariff
on final consumption goods. But there is a second possibility: a deficit
country can raise its tariff on intermediate investment goods. This result
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is really quite general. We have focused on second-best equilibria in
a model that captures the general properties of growing economies
where economies of scale do not come into play and agents do not live
forever. In this class of models, net trade creation is synonymous with
increases in economic growth. This result is the second fundamental
contribution of this chapter.
It is straightforward to apply the preceding analysis to customs
unions. Since each economy has a standard concave production fron
tier, the supply curve in each sector is upward sloping. Thus, if countries
in a union trade with countries outside the bloc, the relative price in any
member is determined by the common external tariff. 11 Hence, the ef
fects of customs union formation are captured by changing the various
tariffs to a common external tariff. Then the union's effect on world
growth depends on whether it increases the average rate of protection
of the consumption sector.
Let U c {I, ... , n} be the index set of the countries forming the cus
toms union and suppose that the union imposes a common external
relative consumption tariff TO, while removing all internal trade bar
riers. A customs union increases the average rate of protection of the
consumption sector if and only if

(To)l~e > L»)(Tj)1~/L)J.
jEU

(20)

jEU

If the members had the same relative tariffs Tj, then Inequality (20)
collapses to TO > T j .

Again, the growth effects of customs union formation depend on
the presence of dynamic trade creation. Suppose that the countries
in the union were a net source of foreign investment in the original
distorted equilibrium. Then Equations (15) and (19) imply that growth
increases if and only if Inequality (20) holds. Increased protection of
consumption raises the share of income going to the high savers in
the world economy, and the customs union creates an excess supply of
investment and raises growth. On the other hand, if the union chose
a high common external investment tariff, then the resulting excess
11

Thus, we need not be concerned with the special case analyzed by Wonnacott and Wonnacott
(1981), in which the formation of a customs union causes one of the members to switch all
of its exports of a good from the rest of the world to its partners. Also, because the supply
curves are upward sloping, we will not have the type of trade diversion that occurs in models
with perfectly elastic supply when all of one partner's imports are switched from outside
the bloc to a union partner.
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demand for investment slows growth. These results are reversed if
the bloc had the opposite trade pattern in the original equilibrium.
Finally, Equation (19) implies that any union has a strong effect on
world growth if it is large or if the marginal efficiency of investment is
high.
5. THE GROWTH EFFECTS OF A FREE TRADE AREA

Our analysis of free trade areas makes use of the important insight of
Richardson (1995). He shows that producer prices will be equalized
across countries within the free trade area even if rules of origin pre
vent consumer arbitrage between partner countries. This simple but
valuable observation is employed by Grossman and Helpman (1995)
to narrow the number of interesting outcomes from the formation of
a free trade area down to three cases. They refer to these as enhanced
protection, reduced protection, and intermediate protection, a combina
tion of the first two.
Assume that countries j and k are partners in the free trade area.
We follow Grossman and Helpman in focusing on protection of a sin
gle good; however, we do not impose their small-country assumption.
The interesting cases involve commodities that are imported by at least
one of the partners. Without loss of generality, assume that the con
2:
sumption tariff rate in j is not lower than that in Ie, thus,
Before the formation of the free trade area, consumers and produc
ers in j and k face prices Pt,l and Pt,1, respectively. If j's demand
for consumption at r{ Pt,l exceeds total output in the free trade area,
then j will import consumption goods from the rest of the world at
r{ Pt,l, the common producer price in the bloc. All of k's consumption
output is exported to j, while all consumption in k is imported from
the rest of the world at the lower price Pt,l. Thus, for given world
prices, producer and consumer prices in j and consumer prices in k are
unaffected by the free trade area, but producers in k receive greater
protection than before. This is Grossman and Helpman's enhanced
protection case.
In contrast, if, at the lower price Pt,l, the combined output in the
free trade area exceeds the demand for consumption in j, then the
consumer and producer price in both countries will be driven down to
Pt,l, the reduced protection case. Now the free trade area is equiva
lent to a fall in j's most-favored-nation consumption tariff.

rf rf.
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rf

The intermediate case arises if there exists a price between Pt,1
and Pt,1 at which j's demand for consumption is exactly satisfied
by the combined outputs of j and k. This situation is essentially a
combination of the reduced and enhanced protection cases. For our
purposes, sufficient insight can be 0 btained by focusing on the two polar
cases. However, it is necessary to make clear what is meant by these
two cases in the presence of terms-of-trade effects and in a dynamic
framework.
Incorporating terms-of-trade effects is straightforward. Simply de
fine enhanced and reduced protection as before with the world prices
taken at their market-clearing levels in each period. However, the com
plication arising from a dynamic analysis is potentially more trouble
some. For example, a case of enhanced protection may later switch to
one of reduced protection. Fortunately, the same regime applies for all
time.
To see this, consider now the case of a free trade area between j and
k. Let

rf

(21)
define the enhanced protection case. The term Ak(k!.1)e makes explicit
that output of the consumption good in country k now depends on
producer prices in country j. Since !";.t = Ak(k{ 1)e - m/, it follows from
Equation (17) that !";.t / (kt,lj )e is independent of t. Thus the condition in
Equation (21) is independent of time.
Likewise,

k Pt )] > 0
'lit == Aj('fi
"t,1 )e + Ak('J<
"t,1 )e - Aj[ ctj,t-1( r k, Pt ) + ctj,t( r,
(22)
defines the reduced protection case, where now firms in both countries
produce using the capital-labor ratio l' Now the terms C{,t-1 (r k , PI)
and c/,t (r k , Pt) show that consumers in j face the consumption price in
k. Since Equation (8) implies that k{ d 1 is independent of t, one can
show analogously that 'lit/U<:'1)e a~d, hence, Equation (22) are also
independent of time. Continuity establishes the analogous fact for the
regime of intermediate protection. Hence, a free trade area will stay
in the same regime.
We first consider a free trade area that involves changes in con
sumption tariffs. Again, the reduced protection case for consumption

k:

k:
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is equivalent to country j's lowering its most-favored-nation relative
tariff to rf Ird. Thus the growth effects of the free trade area depend
on whether j was a host or a source of foreign investment in the orig
inal distorted equilibrium. If j had been a host of foreign investment,
the positive growth effects are captured by Equation (19). Otherwise,
the free trade area slows growth. These effects are significant if the
marginal efficiency of investment is high or if country j itself is large.
The case of a free trade area that gives rise to enhanced consumption
protection is less straightforward. Now producer prices in k are higher
than consumer prices there, and the term for m7 in Equation (15) is
replaced by

(ptrje I r)1~8 ((1 - e)(rf Irf)(ak(r I G) + (1 - ak)) - 1).
Since rf :::: rf ' the partial derivative of this expression with respect to r j
is positive if country kimports the consumption good before the advent
of the free trade area. In this case, a protection-enhancing policy raises
world growth. Thus, a sufficient uncondition for such a free trade area
to raise growth is that the low-tariff partner was originally a source of
foreign investment.
We consider second a free trade area that changes investment tar
iffs. The situation is different for trade in these goods. A free trade
area necessarily entails a regime of reduced protection for investment
goods. The argument is by contradiction. Let r~ == min{rd, rt} and
r{ == max{rd, rt} be the minimum and maximum of the two relevant
investment tariffs. Suppose there is an equilibrium with enhanced pro
tection for investment. Then "consumer" and producer prices for in
vestment in one country are r{ Pt,2, while the consumer price of the
investment in the other country is r~ Pr,2 and the producer price there
is r{ Pt ,2. Of course, the consumer price of the intermediate investment
good is what firms pay to acquire an increment to their capital stock,
whereas its producer price is what a firm in the investment-goods sector
earns by selling it.
Consider buying a machine in the country with the high investment
tariff and then renting out the increment to the capital stock in the next
period; such a transaction earns unity in present prices because it is a
simple risk-free way to transfer income across periods. But a producer
in the low-tariff country can also buy an investment good from the rest
of the world and use the incremental capital to produce investment
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goods for resale in the trading partner's market. This transaction yields
a return of r z'Pt+l,Zr IrzPt,z > 1, since the price of the investment good
in the trading partner's market is r{ Pt+l,Z. Of course, this situation
is inconsistent with equilibrium, even when rules of origin ensure pro
tection of local intermediate goods.
Hence, reduced protection of the investment good will mean that the
appropriate relative tariffs become r11rz and rf/rz' and the country
with the formerly higher investment tariff now experiences an increase
in its r i . Thus, world growth increases if and only if that country was
a source of foreign direct investment in the original distorted equilib
rium. The unifying principle is this: a free trade area increases world
growth if and only if it increases the bloc's imports of consumption,
yielding a world excess supply of investment and an equilibrating fall
in interest rates.
6. CONCLUSION

Our work can answer some broad empirical questions with minimal
data. For example, it is possible to predict that a preferential trading
arrangement will cause dynamic trade creation and, hence, increased
world growth simply by knowing the bloc's pattern of trade, trade
barriers, national populations, savings ratios, and direction of foreign
investment. Most of these data are readily available. If one also knows
the technological parameters and tariff revenues, then it is possible to
calculate explicit growth effects for each case we have analyzed.
Although we have pursued positive questions, our analysis has strong
normative implications for the welfare effects of the formation of pref
erential trading arrangements. Calculating the full effects of tariffs in
a dynamic framework, however, requires deriving the transition path,
whereas we have confined ourselves to balanced growth. An evalu
ation of a free trade area might contrast the long-run growth effects
against the usual short-run static effects. An exercise comparable to
that performed by Baldwin (1992) would reveal the relative magni
tudes of these two considerations.
We might emphasize that our results do not depend on the spe
cific production functions (1) and (2) and utility functions (5a) and
(5b). There are three crucial elements that determine the balanced
growth path: the marginal efficiency of investment, the income share
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ofthe fixed factor, and the marginal propensity to save from permanent
income. Let fz(kf 2) be the intensive form of investment production;
then define limk{~-->oo t2.ck!,2) == r, and all the properties about the
marginal efficiency of investment used in describing the balanced
growth path are still true. Likewise, let I(kt) be any neoclassical pro
ductionfunction; then the sequence {k!'1 1{(k!.I)/11 (k!.I)}~1 has at least
one accumulation point because capital's share is between zero and
one. Let this accumulation point be ej and set e = 'L J=1 ).) ej ; then
the growth rate would still not exceed (1 - e)r, just as Equation (16)
shows.
How general is our assumption about utility function (5b)7 As long
as preferences are smooth, one can always define a savings rate from
permanent income; this rate might depend on the real interest rates
in the world economy. Still, on a balanced growth path, there would
be some constant real interest rate and some corresponding savings
propensity so that an analog of Equation (13) describes the growth rate.
Thus, any entirely general specification of a neoclassical economy with
two sectors would help describe the transitional effects of commercial
policy, and a general specification of our model might have multiple
equilibria with balanced growth. But in the long run, the growth effects
of trade policies would be much as we have described.
The assumption that agents live for only two periods might seem
restrictive. However, what really matters is not that agents live for
two periods but rather that the fixed factor that we have called labor is
used intensively in the consumption-goods sector. Then protecting that
sector raises the share of income that accrues to savers in that country.
How this affects the world savings rate is the essence of our analysis.
Any theory of endogenous growth that takes seriously the notion that
people do not live forever must confront the fact that they acquire an
arbitrarily large amount of the capital from finite streams of income.
Thus, it is not the fact that agents live for two periods that matters, but
it is crucial that tariffs have simple general equilibrium effects on the
distribution of income.
On the other hand, our assumption about the redistribution of tariff
revenues matters quite a bit. National generatio~al surpluses or deficits
indeed affect the growth rate of the world economy, as Fisher (1994)
has emphasized. Still, we isolated the effects of commercial policy from
policies that redistribute income across generations. It is then a robust
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result in a wide class of models that increased relative consumption
tariffs raise the real income of fixed factors. Then the growth effect
of commercial policy depends on whether the country in question is a
source of outward foreign investment.
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